IN THE CIRCUIT COURT

THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS

MADISON COUNTY

                                              

FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,               )

                                                                       )

                                    Plaintiff(s),                   )

                                                                       )

v.                                                                    )

KENNETH LUNG, Individually;                       )           Court No.: 92 L 1083

KENNETH LUNG as Agent and Employee      )

of BOB THOMAS PAINTING; ROBERT       )

HARRIS THOMAS, Individually and                )           Honorable P.J. O*Neill

BOB THOMAS as Agent and Owner               )           Presiding

of BOB THOMAS PAINTING; and UNION   )

ELECTRIC COMPANY.                                )

                                                                       )

                                    Defendant(s).               )

                                                                      

RESPONSE OF FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH TO MOTION

TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS’, KENNETH LUNG, INDIVIDUALLY;

KENNETH LUNG AS AGENT AND EMPLOYEE OF BOB THOMAS

PAINTING; ROBERT HARRIS THOMAS, INDIVIDUALLY AND

BOB THOMAS AS AGENT AND OWNER OF

BOB THOMAS PAINTING

                                                                             

BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

 

On January 14, 1993 counsel for Plaintiff received the motion of Defendants, KENNETH LUNG, Individually; KENNETH LUNG as Agent and Employee of BOB THOMAS PAINTING; ROBERT HARRIS THOMAS, Individually and BOB THOMAS as Agent and owner of BOB THOMAS PAINTING, hereafter (“THOMAS”) to dismiss. This motion is attached as Exhibit A to this response. On January 15, 1993 THOMAS*S motion was briefly argued before this Honorable Court. This Court allowed Plaintiff fourteen (14) days or until January 29, 1993 to file a written response.

ARGUMENT:

                                                                             

DEFENDANT THOMAS’S MOTION IS INSUFFICIENT ON ITS FACE TO

ESTABLISH THAT THOMAS PAINTING’S ACTIVITIES CONSTITUTE EITHER “CONSTRUCTION” OR IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY”

UNDER ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 735 PAR. 5/13-214.

 

           Whether THOMAS*S motion is presented under Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 735 Par. 5/2-615 or 5/2-619 is not clear. However, as THOMAS*S motion raises Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 735 Par. 5/13-214 as a statute of limitations defense, the matter must be examined under Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 735 Par. 5/2-619.  Williams v. Board of Education 222 Ill. App. 3d 559, 584 N.E. 2d 257, 260 (1st Dist., 1991). Similarly, the burden is on THOMAS* to establish that he is protected by Ill Rev. Stat. Ch. 735 Par 5/13-214.

           Review of THOMAS*S motion does not establish his painting activities involve “the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property” as required by Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 735 Par. 5/13-214 (a). No facts are asserted by THOMAS how his painting repairs constitute “an improvement to real property” within Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 735 Par. 5/13-214 (a). In this regard, THOMAS must establish in his motion that THOMAS PAINTING’S activities are in fact an improvement to real property and not just painting repairs. See People v. Helimuth, Obata & Kassabaum 114 Ill. 2d 252, 500 N.E. 2d 34, 37 (1986). Based on THOMAS* motion (Exhibit A), no such showing is made.

           Aside from the insufficient showing in the motion itself, THOMAS has not established that the painting repairs he attempted provide him the protections afforded by Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 735 Par. 5/13-214 (a). The well established definition of an improvement to real property is found in Calumet Country Club v. Robert’s Environmental  Control Corporation 136 Ill. App. 3d 610, 483 N.E. 2d 613, 616 (1st Dist., 1985). In Calumet, the landowner brought action against the installing contractor of a piping connection between a municipal water main and the buildings water system. The court defined the meaning of “improvement”:

An “improvement” is an addition to real property amounting to more than a mere repair or replacement, and which substantially enhances the value of the property. (citations omitted)...Improvements include buildings and substantial additions or changes to existing buildings”. Id.

 

            As the Calumet court had before it, an insufficient record to establish whether the piping connection was a substantial new addition to the building or merely in the nature of a repair or replacement, the court remanded the issue to the trial court.

            Similarly, in the recent opinion of St. Louis v. Rockwell Graphics (Supreme Court of Ill. Doc. # 72779) 1992 WL 297603, the court considered whether the installation of a new printing press was an “improvement to real property” under 13-214. Citing Hilliard v. Lumnus Co. 834 F. 2d 1352, 1354 (7th Cir., 1987) and Calumet Country Club v. Robert’s Environmental Control Corporation 136 Ill App. 3d 610, 483 N.E. 2d 613 (1st Dist., 1985) the court stated:

“Relevant criteria for determining what constitutes an improvement to real property” include: whether the addition was meant to be permanent or temporary, whether it became an integral component of the overall system, whether the value of the property increased and whether the use of the property was enhanced”.  Slip.  Op. at 5-6.

 

            Based on the court*s opinion in St. Louis, THOMAS has not shown how ordinary painting repairs either amount to an “improvement” or can be defined as “construction activity”.[1]  On the contrary, painting activities by their very nature, are simply necessary repairs performed solely for ordinary maintenance or cosmetic reasons. See Marriage of Katherine Ford 175 Ill App. 3d 870, 330 N.E. Ld2 556, 558 (4th Dist., 1988).

            Reading the four page services contract attached to Plaintiff*s complaint, shows the work that THOMAS performed included painting, scraping, and caulking of existing weathered surfaces. Carpentry was specifically excluded. Reference is made to painting and scraping existing windows and doors, not upgrading or replacing with new ones. Similarly, sanding, caulking and finishing of existing surfaces was contemplated, not constructing, modernizing or building new ones.  No reference is made to upgrading, bettering or otherwise, altering the existing church property for new or further purposes. Hilliard v. Lumnus Company, Inc. 834 F. 2d 1352, 1354 (7th Cir., 1987). Contemplated by THOMAS*S services contract was a routine paint job, not substantial additions or renovations to existing church buildings.[2]

CONCLUSION

            It is THOMAS who bears the responsibility to establish that his painting activities are protected under Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 735 Par. 5/13-214. THOMAS*S motion does not plead a basis upon which this court can find that his painting services constituted either “construction activities” or construction of an improvement to real property. Similarly, THOMAS*S Motion to does not establish that his activities amounted to more than a mere repair or replacement of existing church properties.

            WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to deny the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants, KENNETH LUNG, Individually; KENNETH LUNG as Agent and Employee of BOB THOMAS PAINTING; ROBERT HARRIS THOMAS, Individually and BOB THOMAS as Agent and Owner of BOB THOMAS PAINTING, and order them to answer Plaintiff*s Complaint at Law.

 

                                                                                               Respectfully Submitted,

                                                                                               FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

                                                                                               BY:  

                                                                                                        Attorney for Plaintiff       

Lowell D. Snorf, III

LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL D. SNORF, III

25 East Washington Street

Suite 1500

Chicago, Illinois 60602

Telephone: (312) 984-0421

Attorney No.: 71148



[1]          

The term “improvement” includes:

 

“not only buildings and fixtures of all kinds, but many other things as well. Among the most common illustrations of such general improvements are the erection of a building; the replacing of old buildings with new ones; substantial repairs to a building or repairs necessary to preserve a building; the making of substantial additions to or changes in existing buildings; the construction of a necessary sidewalk alongside property; the erection of fences; the preparation of land for building sites; the preparation of wild or raw land for agricultural purposes; and the planting of a fruit orchard.” 41 Am. Jur. 2d Sect. 1, 1968, “Improvements. Similarly, “construction” is defined as “the creation of something new”, as distinguished from the repair or improvement of something already existing. BLACK*S LAW DICTIONARY, 283 (5th ed., 1979).

[2]

Most Illinois opinions discussing limitations found in Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 735 Par. 5/13-214 have consistently found that a business engaged in construction activity must provide the real property with something “new” and “different” before allowing a defendant the protections afforded by 13-214. For example, in Cross v. Ainsworth Seed Company 199 Ill. App. 3d 910, 557 N.E. 2d 906, 934, the appellate court found the installation of a new conveyor system covered by 13-214.  See also:  Cates v. Hunter Engineering 205 Ill. App. 3d 587, 563 N.E. 2d 1239 (3rd Dist., 1990) (design and installation of a new cold rolling mill, integrally improving the plants operation affords 13-2 14 protection); American National bank v. Booth/Hansen 186 Ill. App. 3d, 865, 542 N.E. 2d 925 (1st Dist., 1989) (new excavation of next door property covered by 13-214); St. Louis v. Rockford Graphics (Supreme Court of Illinois Doc. # 727779, 1992 WL 297603) (installation of new printing press, potentially covered by 13-214); and Neofotistos v. Metrick Electric Company, Inc. 217 Ill. App. 3d 506, 577 N.E. 2d 511, 513 (2nd Dist., 1991) (new electrical system installed during construction of shopping mall which substantially enhanced the value of the otherwise unlighted and unpowered shopping center covered by. 13-214).