IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
DU PAGE COUNTY, WHEATON,
ILLINOIS
ROBERT CHAMBERLIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v.
) No.:
2003 L 000103
)
KURT KAMKA, Individually, and as Agent of )
ROADRUNNERS AUTO TRANSPORT, INC., )
)
Defendants. )
AMENDED
MOTIONS IN LIMINE WITH ORDER
NOW COME the Defendants, KURT KAMKA and ROADRUNNERS
DRIVEAWAY, INC, by and through their attorney, LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL D. SNORF, III,
and for purposes of trial request the Plaintiff, ROBERT CHAMBERLIN, III, be
barred from testifying or referencing to the following:
1. Bar Robert Chamberlin, III from
referencing, using, or relying upon, any of State Farm Mutual Insurance
Company’s paid medical bills as damages in this case.
REASON: Robert
Chamberlin, III admitted all of his medical bills were paid by State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company (Robert Chamberlin deposition, p. 51, 58). State Farm Mutual Insurance Company’s
medical payment subrogation claim was the subject of a lawsuit entitled, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company a/s/o
Linda and Robert Chamberlin v. Kurt
Kamka and Roadrunners Driveaway, Inc., Case No. 2002 AR 003368 (see
Exhibit “A,” State Farm Complaint, Par. 13).
The insurance contract between State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and
Linda Chamberlin assigned the right of medical payment subrogation directly to
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company.
The medical bills paid by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company were as follows:
City of Naperville EMS: 03/27/01 $ 300.00
Edward Hospital: 03/27/01; 1,818.56
05/25/01
Naperville
Radiologists: 03/27/01 334.00
M
& M Orthopedics: 04/05/01
- 514.00
06/12/01
Dr.
Hassan Moghadam: 05/22/01 240.00
Orthosport: 04/10/02 - 4,369.00
07/12/01
TOTAL BILLS: $ 7,575.56
On February 24, 2004, Lancer Insurance Company, on behalf of
Kurt Kamka and Roadrunner Driveaway, Inc., agreed to settle State Farm Mutual
Insurance Company’s property damage and medical payment case for
$13,000.00. Settlement of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company’s case by Lancer
Insurance Company, on behalf of Kurt Kamka and Roadrunner Driveaway, Inc.,
included State Farm Mutual Insurance Company’s property damage with deductible,
and all medical bills paid by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, including
bills from the City of Naperville, Edward Hospital, Naperville Radiologists, M
& M Orthopedics, Dr. Hassan Moghadam, and Orthosport (see Exhibit “B,”
February 24, 2004 Court Order).
As Lancer Insurance Company
paid State Farm Mutual Insurance Company’s medical payment subrogation claim,
Robert Chamberlin, III can no longer make reference to these medical bills or
include them as damages in this case, as they are not relevant to this case. In
Illinois, the collateral source rule is defined as:
“Benefits received by an injured party from a source wholly
independent of and collateral to, a tortfeasor will not diminish damages
otherwise recoverable from the fortfeasor” §40 Collateral Source Rule, Illinois Law and Practice, p. 416
(2001).
The collateral source
rule is predicated on the theory a tortfeasor has no interest in and no right
to benefit from monies received by the injured person from sources unconnected
with the defendant. A collateral source
is “a source [that] is entirely independent of and collateral to a wrongdoer
who is legally responsible for the injuries.”
Thus, while a victim’s own insurance may be a collateral source, a
tortfeasor’s insurance is not. Chenega Corporation v. Exxon Corporation,
991 P.2d 769, 789 (Alaska, 1999).
When either the
Defendant or Defendant’s insurance carrier is the source of payment, the
Plaintiff cannot rely on those damages paid for by the defendant. People
v. Roop, 267 Ill.App.3d 191,
658 N.E.2d 469 (3rd Dist., 1995).
Expanding on the collateral source rule exception discussed in People v. Roop, 658 N.E.2d at 469, is the decision of Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.App.4th 125, 32
Cal.Rptr.2d 643 (2nd Dist., 1994) which in part wrote:
“Under the collateral source rule, one
who suffers injury through the wrongful act of another is not precluded from
proceeding against the wrongdoer for compensation, nor is the amount of compensation
reduced, by receipt by the victim of payments from a source independent of the
wrongdoer (Anheuser‑Busch, Inc.
v. Starley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 347, 349, 170 P.2d 448), and the defendant
in such an action cannot introduce evidence of any such payments (Helfend v. Southern Calif. Rapid Transit
Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6‑13, 84 Cal.Rptr. 173, 465 P.2d 61).
However, the rule does not apply if the victim has been reimbursed before trial
by a cash payment from the defendant personally or from the defendant's
insurance carrier. (Blake v. E.
Thompson Petroleum Repair Co. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 823, 832 216
Cal.Rptr. 568; Turner v. Mannon (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 134, 140,
45 Cal.Rptr. 831; Dodds v. Bucknum (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 206,
212-213, 29 Cal.Rptr. 393.).”
The collateral source
rule is still concerned with the source of payment. In order for Robert Chamberlin, III to invoke the collateral
source rule, Robert Chamberlin, III must show the benefits Robert Chamberlin, III
received are from a source independent of and collateral to Kurt Kamka
and Roadrunners Driveaway, Inc. or Defendants’ insurance carrier. Here, the collateral source rule does not
apply because the medical bills were paid by Defendants’ insurance carrier, a
source not wholly independent of and collateral to Kurt Kamka and Roadrunners
Driveaway, Inc.
To allow Plaintiff to
seek damages for the medical expenses paid by State Farm Mutual Insurance
Company prejudices Defendants. Defendants already paid the bills.
As a matter of public policy, Defendants would never have agreed to pay State Farm Mutual Insurance Company’s subrogation claim if the Plaintiff could then use the same bills to force Defendants to pay medical expense bills a second time.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
2. No
reference that Defendants have insurance; no reference to Defendants’ insurance
adjusters, Defendants’ insurance claim handling, or any matter referencing Defendants’
insurance or insurance investigators; no reference Defendants’ insurance
carrier is paying any bills.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
3. No
reference to any prior settlement, compromise, or offer.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
4. That
all counsel refrain from vouching for the credibility of any witness.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
5. That
all counsel refrain from asking jurors to put themselves in
the position of Plaintiff or
Defendants.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
6. No reference to any police reports, as
such evidence is inadmissible under 625 ILCS 5/11-412.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
7. No reference that David E. Detzner of Active
Investigations was hired by any insurance company to provide testimony in this
case; no reference David E. Detzner had conferences with any insurance claim
representative about any aspect of this case, or that David E. Detzner
customarily testifies for insurance companies.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
8. No
reference to the size or financial wealth of any individual or entity named as
a Defendant in this case.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
9. Bar Police Officer Edwards and/or any
police officer and any witness or party from discussing any tickets issued
to Kurt Kamka.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
10. Bar
Police Officer Edwards and/or any police officer from offering accident
reconstruction testimony, as such opinions have not been disclosed under S.C.R.
213; there are occurrence witnesses to the action, and reconstruction testimony
is not admissible. Hiscott v. Peters, 324 Ill.App 3d 114, 754 N.E.2d 839 (2nd Dist., 2001).
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
11. No
reference to any lost income claim of Robert Chamberlin, III, as said claim has
been withdrawn; no reference Robert Chamberlin, III could not work as a result
of the accident or injuries caused by the accident (see attachment “A”). Defendants request this Honorable Court
exclude any testimony or documentary evidence or mention of any evidence
regarding Plaintiff’s claim for wage loss, and bar Plaintiff from arguing or
referencing Plaintiff missed time from work, worked in a diminished capacity,
lost income and/or lost contracting jobs.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
12. No
reference that Plaintiff was in a weakened condition as a result of the March
27, 2001 accident and is now more susceptible to future injury; no treatment
opinion or S.C.R. 213 disclosure has been offered to establish same.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
13. Relative
to the March 27, 2001 occurrence, no discussion, reference or evidence that
Kurt Kamka is responsible for the increased risk of future injuries to Robert
Chamberlin, III resulting from the March 27, 2001 accident. Dillon
v. Evanston Hospital 771 N.E. 2d. 357 (2002). No opinions have been disclosed pursuant to S.C.R. 213.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
14. No
reference as to permanency, permanent medical condition, or permanent
disability; no S.C.R. 213(f) and (g) disclosures have identified any such
condition; no doctor’s testimony has been offered to support a claim of
permanency; Robert Chamberlin, III testified no physician ever diagnosed a
permanent injury or disability (Robert Chamberlin, III deposition, p.71).
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
15. No reference to the injuries of anyone
other than Robert Chamberlin, III; no reference to injuries or property damage of
any party or any vehicle such as would suggest Robert Chamberlin, III was
injured.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
16. Pursuant
to DiCosola v. Bowman, 342
Ill.App.3d 530, 794 N.E.2d 875 (2003), no use or reference to vehicle
photographs in this case. State Farm’s
property damage and medical payment subrogation claim has been settled. Defendants are admitting negligence in
causing the accident. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s use of any vehicle photographs is irrelevant to the case.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
17. Bar Police Officer Edwards and/or any
police officer from offering opinions as to fault of any involved driver, as no such opinions have been disclosed in
any S.C.R. 213 interrogatory answers.
REASON: The testimony of Bar Police Officer Edwards and/or any police
officer should be confined to the matters contained within the police report
and no other opinions should be allowed.
There has been no disclosure of any opinions, conclusions, or
qualifications of Bar Police Officer Edwards and/or any police officer other
than what is contained in report.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
18. Bar any
reference or implication by Bar Police Officer Edwards and/or any police
officer as to the fault of any driver in this case; further bar him from
describing the amount of property damage.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
19. Bar
Plaintiff from requesting or arguing Plaintiff is entitled to aggravation of
any pre-existing ailment from David Russo resulting from the March 27, 2001
accident.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
20. Bar
Plaintiff from making any claim for future medical expense; no future claim for
medical expense has been disclosed in response to S.C.R. 213(f) and (g)
interrogatories; further, no claim for future medical expense is warranted as
Plaintiff’s last treatment date was may 16, 2001.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
21. No lay
witness medical testimony concerning any medical diagnosis rendered or given by
any physician; no hearsay reference to any physician’s medical finding.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
22. No testimony
by any lay person or physician the speed of any accident is indicative of any
injuries; no opinion is disclosed in any S.C.R. 213 interrogatory answers, nor
is it an elaboration of a disclosed opinion.
Boehm v. Ramsey, 329
Ill.App.3d 357, 771 N.E.2d 493 (4th Dist., 2002).
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
23. No
testimony by any person as to the speed of any vehicles involved in the
accident.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
24. Bar all
parties from referencing or arguing any medical bills or medical expenses
incurred in this case. All medical
bills have been paid by Defendants.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
25. Bar
Robert Chamberlin, III from referencing or arguing any medical expenses
incurred are a factor in any claim for pain and suffering and/or loss of normal
life. I.P.I. 30.04.01 and I.P.I. 30.05
are separate damage instructions.
Arguing medical expenses are a factor in any claim for pain and
suffering and loss of normal life is inconsistent with I.P.I. 30.04.01 and
I.P.I. 30.05 and should be barred.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
26. Bar any
discussion by any party about property damage to the vehicles, as the
subrogation property damage claim has been paid and is no longer relevant in
the case.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
27. In this
case, the Defendants have admitted to liability. As such, any evidence relating
to the nature of his liability and his actions leading up to the subject
incident, are irrelevant and should be excluded. Courts have held that evidence of Defendant s liability might be
relevant if necessary to prove damages. See Phillips v.
Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60, 61-63 (5th Dist. 1967). However, in the present case, the facts
surrounding the cause of the accident will in no way assist the jury in
determining the nature and extent of the Plaintiff s injuries or damages. In the present case, the circumstances of
the occurrence do not provide probative value regarding the nature of the
injuries. In addition, the nature of the injuries can be fully established
through other competent evidence and therefore, admitting the liability
evidence would be cumulative, even if it were probative. Any evidence of
liability will only serve to prejudice the Defendant in the eyes of the
jurors, by focusing on Defendant’s wrongdoing. This is not only improper, but,
as stated above, it is clearly prejudicial to the Defendant. For all the reasons stated above, the Defendants
request that this Court exclude any reference at trial, including physical
evidence, witness testimony, and attorney comments relating to the Defendants’
liability. Defendants move this
Honorable Court for an order excluding any and all evidence, references to
evidence, testimony or argument relating to Defendants’ liability in this
action. Defendants have admitted they
were negligent, and therefore the only issues remaining are the nature and
extent of Plaintiff’s claimed injuries.
The motion is based upon the grounds that the evidence is irrelevant,
immaterial, confusing, and will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice
to Defendants.
Granted Denied Reserved Withdrawn
Atty. No. 71148
Name Lowell
D. Snorf, III , 20__
Attorney for Defendants
Address 77
West Washington, Suite 703 ENTER:
City Chicago
Telephone (312)
726-8961
Judge Judge’s No.